process and instead attai n automaticall y the same status as a biological parent. " Likewise. a homosexual couple arranging the creation of a child can do the same thing. so that two persons of the same sex could become the chi ld's "nat ural parents:'· · Most disturbi ngly. the logical conclusion of intent theory guarantees that " intending parents" will always wi n over biological contributors in patern ity disputes. In theol) ' . an adopting couplc cou ld sue for specili c perfonnan ce if. for example. a surrogate mother reneged on an agree m e nt. ~ This jurisprudential specu lati on may be premature and dangerous. In the exc itement over the supposedl y positive applications o f intent theol) ' . scholars may have overlooked the negative ones . The te rm "intent" inevitabl y brings to mind contract and property law. 5 Enforcing the promi ses of up to fi ve people might be licit but for the involvement of a sixth person who has 110 say in the mailer: the child. whose life has been haggled over. bartered, and given a judicial stamp. Whil e there has yet to be a fi ve-way di spute over a child 's patern ity. wi th the increasi ng use of ass isted reproduction. the questi on is now one of when. and how we ll intent theory holds up when it is trul y tested.
Thi~ article proposes that the intent theory of ART parentage is mi splaced and dangerous. In settling future di sputes over legal parentage. court s and legislatures should first consistent ly remember the inherent di gnity of the child at the heart of the di spute. Thi s article then will examine Ihe flaws of intent theory in light of the mean ing of human di gnity, and conclude that court s should seek an alternative means of resolving these di sputes.
II . The Nature of Assisted Reproductive Technology
Assisted reproducti ve techn ologies can take several differelll fonn s. many of which require more Ihan two people. For purposes of this di scussion . they include "traditi onal " surrogacy arrange ments, "gestational" arrange ments. and sperm donation.
In a "traditional" surrogacy arrangement , the mother bearing the child is impregnated with the sperm of the adopting father. meaning the birth mother is also the child's genetic mother.t > In a ··non -traditi onal" or "gestational" surrogacy. the mother is implanted with the fertilized egg of anOlher woman . and has no genetic relationship with the child . There. the child 's genetic material may be supplied by one or both of the indi vidual s intend ing to rai se the child (although ge netic material also can be fro m anonymous donorsV A "substitute fath er" can also be used: a fert ile woman may be artific ially inseminated with the sperm of a man other than her husband (called "heterologous" artificial in seminati on), also often a n o n y m ous l y.~
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Li nacrc Quarterly Coupl es are thus capable or combining any of these procedures to birth a child, such Ihat it is now poss ibl e to have up to fi ve "pare nts" of a c hild : a spe rm donor, egg donor. gestational surrogate, and two adoptive parents. 811::;(/11('(( is appare ntl y a rare example of that combination: usuall y. a single person has several contributions. For example. in one famou s surrogacy case. the egg donor and gcslntor we re the same person. as we re the sperm donor and adopt ive fa ther.'J Where the donors are known. the contracting parti es of len agree thm the donor wi ll relinqui sh a ll parental claims to the child.
Such arrangements arc essentiall y the cqui valent of pri vate adoplion s lO (Often. the non-genetic parent is requ ired to ronnall y adopt the child). For example, a gestational sUlTogate would agree to carry the child to te rm and the n sUITcnder her at birth . States vary on thc enforceabili ty of such arrangements: some reg ulate them by statute. others hold thclll void as a matte r or publ ic policy. and a few still bold them il legal. 11 
Ill. The [m'iolability of Child Dignity
The fi rst premi se of this article is thaI. in resolving the issue of the c hild 's pare nt age. the inali e nable di gnity of the chi ld in question mu st be respected and protected by the legal system. The law cannot forge t that the life of n (,·hild. not a chattel. is at the heart of these disput es . While thi s noti on should be one of common se nse , all eX<lminmi on of inte nt theory reveals that thi s basic respect for c hildren is now a secondary consideration. A brief examination of the concept of dignity is therefore in order.
A chi ld's dignity is. of course. the same notion of dignit y that 3pplies to all human persons. That concept appears in the United States' Declaration o r I nd e pend e n ce . l~ in the Preamble of the United Nation s' C harler. l .1 and the United Nations' Uni versal Declaration of Hu man Ri g ht s. l~ The Declaration of Huma n Rights in parti cular bolds that di gnity vests at birth because c hildren are considered "persons" from birth . and because human dignity ex te nds to all persons. it must follow that this concept of inal ie nabl e dignity belongs to children as wel l.
The concept of human di gni ty is unfortunatel y diffic ult 10 defin e prec i se l y.l~ but is sti ll considered the source of all human right s. II> Whil e the modern connotati on of the word is apparently shifting from the Chri stian noti on of "sacredness" to one centered on indi vidual autonomy in stcad Y Ihe basic term is still sy nonymous with the "intrinsic worth" of Ihe individual. ls In havin g intrin sic worth. human beings are an end unto themsel ves. It is therefore always illi cit to use persons as a mea ns to an e nd l '! (such as through bondage). Di gnity al so suggests Ihat one person cannot be more " valuable" than anothe r: instead . there is substantin\ equality hetween persons. o r simply: "Each pe rson is as: good as every other:' l !! Hu man di gnit y is a lso considered "inalie nable," meani ng that it cannot be removed under any c irc um stances. no matter the m e t h od .~1 Govern me nts th us have the power to el iminate slavery and promote decent huma n condi tio ns. 11 Thi s a lso means that while children are not fully capable of exerc ising thei r rights unti l adulthood. and pare nts have the power to exe rcise rig hts o n the ir behalf. 13 parents do not and canno t 0 11'/1 c hi l d re n . !~ Rather. the law assumes Ihat pare nts are stewards of their children until they reach the ir m ajor ity. 1.~
I. Human Dignity According to the Catholic Church
The Catholic C hurch olf ers part ic ul arly insig htful nm io ns of human dig nity. e speciall y in the context of chi ldren and ART. In the eyes of the Church. dig nity is "rooted in [m an 'sJ creal ion in the image and like ness of God:'2b and there fore is inviolab le and unquesli onable Y In C(m le.~· imm· AIIIIUS, Po pe John Pau l [J warned that children shou ld not be considered " as o ne. of the many 'things' which an indi vid ual can have o r not have. accordi ng: to taste. and which compete with o ther poss i b i liti es ."2~ T he statement stems di rectly from the notion of dig nity: c hi ld ren do not ex ist for the sake of appeasing a pare nt 's des ire to have chi ld ren. El sewhere. the Church notes Ihal:
A c hild is nOl ~o m e \h ing owed to one. but is a gift. The "su preme g ifl of marriage" is a human pe rsoll . A c hi ld may 1101 be colisidered a piece of property. an idea to which an alleged ""right 10 a child"" would lead. In th is area. only the c hild possesses genuine righl S: the righl "10 be lile fruil of his parents:' and "lhe righl to be rcsl)e(."ted as a person from the moment of his conception:'."! Therefore. children ha\'e the right " to de\'clop in the mother's womb from the moment of conception" and "the rig ht to li ve in :1 united fmni ly and in a moral cnv ironment con(lu("]ve 10 the growth of Ihe child's personality:''') These ideas are deri ved from the not io n of human di gnilY. Since children. as hum an persons. have di gnity. they cannot be treated as a " means to an e nd:' such as ex istirtg to appease the ir parents' desire to procreate. Rather. in the proper view of the fa mily, the pare nt s' desire to procreate coincides with any c hil dre n born of the marriage. so Ihat the c hild is welcomed into the home. rather than viewed as an ex pectation.
The moral wro ng is partic ularly apparent fro m a rece nt story involvin g ART in which a deaf lesbian couple. Sharon Duchesneau and Candace McCullough. illlelllio1/(/lly genetically engineered two deaf children us in g sperm fro m a deaf do nor.]] The women c laimed that deafness is an identi ty. not a di sabili ty. and wanted their children to share in that identity. They reasoned that "a hearing baby would be a bless ing: a deaf baby wou ld be a speciu ] blessing. I! and frankl y slated that thearrangcment was their altCmpt lo cre ate a "prefect baby . .. ·'3 The intentional disabling of a ch ild and calling it a ··blessing·' severely violates child dign ity to a new degree: in the minds of the couple.
their children are something to be prepackaged and arnmged to sati sfy rludr conception of a "perfect" baby who can share in the ··blessin g'· of deafness.
Apparemly. they ig nored whethe r the childre" wou ld reciproc'l1e that desirc (and it will be intcresti ng if these ch ildren dec ide to sue their parents in the futu re). In the parents' minds. the expeclarioll of having a chi ld who could share their handicap justified the children's intentional mutilalion.
These ideas are crit ical ill accountin g fo r why the Church opposes form s of A RT that separate proc reat io n from the conjuga l act : u Because ch ildren have the right to be conce ived in their mothers' wombs. much of the problem is that ART using genetic material not of the persons who will rai se the child "i nfringes the child's right to be born of a fmh er and mother known to him and bound to each other by maITiage.".1~ While ART invo lving 0111.1' a husband and w ife are " less reprehensibl e" (such <.I S a wife 1111 ific iall y in se minated by her husband 's semen). they still are wrong beca use, in addition to treating the child as something "owed". the act "e ntrusts the life and identity or the e mbryo into the power of the doctors and bio logists and establishes the dominatio n of technology over the origin and destiny of the human person."3/1
The importance of conjugal procreati on. as o pposed to artificia l means. has been stressed by John Paul II:
In conj ugal love and in transmiHing life. the human ca nnot forge t his or her digni ty as a human person: it raises the n<uural order to a certain level. one which ii> no longer mere ly biological. That is why the Church teilches Ihat responsibi lity for love is inseparable from responi>ibilily from procreation. Thl! biologica l phenomeno n of human reproduct ion. where in the human peri>on linds his or her beginnings. al so has as its e nd the emerge nce of a no.: w person. un ique and unrepeatable. made in the image :tnd likeness o f God. The dignity of the procreat ive ao.:t in which the imerpcrsotl:ll love o f the spouses finds in its c ulmination in the new person. in a son or daughter. emerges from lhal facl. ThaI is why lhe C hurch te:u:hcs that open ness to life in conjugal rel :uions protects the very authenticity of the love r('lationship. '7 Thi s statement verifies why the conjugal act is a moral require ment of procreation. In ART techniques which separate the two. the effort "forces" the ch ild into existence for the sati sfaction of the parents ' (admittedl y benevolent) desires. However. in the Church's unde rstanding o f marriage , the uni on of the coupl e in the conjugal act is meant to be "open" to the transmi ssion of life. jS so that any resu ltin g chi ldre n arc welcomed rathe r than ex pected. J9 " No one may subject the comi ng of the child into the world 10 conditions of techni cal e ffi ciency which arc 10 be evaluated accordi ng to standards o f control and dominion ... .I() Whil e pare nt s who procreate through the conjugal acl. like A RT parents. ;11 50 mi ght des ire children fo r the sake of sati sfying the procreative urge. the conjugal act itself does not vio late the c hild 's d ig ni ty. Conjugal procreati on always o perates independe ntl y of the intention of the parents: couples can desire a chi ld and not become pregnant . while o thers can take ste ps to avoid conception and still h;we pregnancy result. Ideall y. the parents' imentio ns should coinc ide with the bi o logica l reality o f the c hild 's conception. So. while parent s' imentio ns mi gh t offe nd the di gnity o f the child. the meatl~ of conception sho uld not.
The Church con siders surrogacy arrangeme nts partic ularly illi cit. "S urrogate motherhood agree me nt s. wit h o r w itho ut the payment o f money. treat the child as 11 non-person. as an item o f propen y to be disposed of at the wi ll of others witho ut regard to hi s own i nt e res t."~' 111is statement works in {~o njun clion with the C hurch' s interpretation of the seve nth commandment. whi ch "prohibits ac tio ns or enterpri ses whi ch for any reaso n-se lfi sh or ide o l og i {~a l , comme rcia l or totalitari an-lead to the e nslavement of human beings, di sreg,lrd for their persona l dignity. buying or selling or exchang ing them like lllerc handi se."~2 A lt ho ugh surrogacy arrangements do no t conjure up belligerent images o f slavery. they nonethel ess fit the I.ec hn ica l defin it ion because the sa le of a child is the result.
Posilive Law Bases of Child Digni ty
Modern American pos iti ve law generall y refl ects the above concepts or human and child digniry. It is ax iomat ic that children are not prope rty.
bUl are persons who need protection from the parent. or failin g that. the s tal e.~3 One autho r notes that '"la1 'child ' is a person. and not a subperson over whom the pare nt has an absolute possessory inte rest a child has rights. too. some or wh ic h are o f a constitutio nal magnitude.""" Likewise . the parent-chi ld relationship is considered a status. neit her a contract nor a property ri ght. The re lati onship is strong enoug h that it can only be altered in accord with due process. 4~ " IT]he usual view is that the right cannot be dealt with as thoug h it were a vested property ri ght. Rather. it is in the nature of a trust imposed o n the parent ro r the c hild 's benefit." .!t> u.s. II. Wiegolld. J7 a c hild pornography c ase. illustrates the importance o f child dig nity. Speaking fo r the Nin th C ircuil o n why child pornog raphy was illegal , Judge Noonan wro te : From a femin ist pers pecti ve. Ih is redu(·tion of hum:1I1ness has been seen as;1 male ollc nse ... BUI whether the person is male or female. the essential operation is the same: an assllUlt upon the humanity of the person piclU red. making that person a mere means serving the voyeur's purposes . . . Human d ignity is atTe nded by Ihe pornographer. American law docs not prolect all human dign ity; legally, an adult c.mnOI consent 10 its diminishment. When a child is made the target of the porn ograp he,r~photogf3phe r. the st'llute will not sutTe r the insult to the huma n spiri t. that the child shou ld be treated as a thing."
At least one court has also reflected the idea that a c hil d is not ··owed'· to an individual. even in li gh t of the constitutional ri ght to procreation. In the fa mou s DalJY M casco part o rthe coun' s justiti cmion for voiding the surrog:lcy contract was its vjew that [tlhe right 10 proneate very simply is the right to have natuml chi ldre n. whether through sexual intercourse or anificial inseminatio n.
[t is no more than Ihal. . The custody. care. companionship. and nurturing Ihal fo llow bi rth are not parts of the right to procreation; Ihey are rights thai may also be constit utionally protected. but tha t involve considerations other than the right of procreat ion.'" While not passin g judgment on ART per sc. clearl y the court was opposed to the notion that tbe ch ild was a .. thing" somehow owed to either of the panies based on their right to procreate.
Ult imately. the issue of human and c hild di gnity by itself does not answer the question of who the propcr parents are in ART di spu tes. Rather, dignity acts as a guideline on how the law should 1/01 act: that is, the law must e nsure that the child's di gnity. already damaged as a product of Art , is not violated any further. The chi ld shou ld never be objectified. but shoul d be considered a rea l party in interest whose fu tu re and identity are at lhe heart of the di spute. Wh ile digni ty implies [hat any determi nati on of November. 2004 parenthood mi ght be acceptable. it docs explicitl y mean thai a theory based o n contract or property is illicit.
IV. Critiquing Inte nt Theo ry in Lig ht of Human Dig nity

A. O rigins of Intent T heory
Popul ar applicatio n of the intent theory of parentage has its orig ins in lohnSOIl I '. C(/I\"(.:' rf.~o a 1993 Cal ifornia case. Mark a nd Crispin a Cal vert were unable 10 bear childre n. and contracted with A nna John son 10 be implanted w ith an embryo conceived from the Ca lverts' game tes. Shortly after implantation , the parti es' relat io nship deteriorated. and Johnson threatened to keep the chi ld unless full payment was made. The Cal ve rts. in turn. sued for a declarat ion that they were the legal pare nt s: Jo hnson countersued for a simi lar declarat io n.
The problem. according 10 the CO llll. was Ihat California a llowed either blood or bi n h as suffi cient proof o f maternity. The relevant statute 's language was permi ssive. using terms such as ""may" and "or:' whi ch the coun viewed as creating equa ll y persuasive alternatives between blood and bi lth. Even the old adage. lIIaler {'Sf quam gestalio demollstmf (by gestation the mothe r is demonstrated ) suggested to the coun that "while gestati on may demonstrate materna l status. il is not the sille qlla 1/011 of mothe rhood. Rather. il is poss ible that the common law viewed genet ic consanguinity as the basis fo r materna l rights ."51 The court reso lved this appare nt con Oict by relying on the parties' in tent ions. ho lding that "when the two means do not coincide in one wOllum. she who intended to create the child-this is. she who intended to bri ng about the birth of the chi ld that she inte nded to raise as her own-is the natu ra l mother under Califo rn ia l aw."~2 Its rat io na le was based primarily o n the theories of Professors H ill 5 .l and S huh z.~~ It first applied Hill" s theory o f ""but-for causation'"; "the child would not have been bo rn but for the effDlt s of the in tended parent s ... The intended pare nt s are the first cause. or the prime movers. of the procreative re lation s h ip:'~ It simi larly relied on Professor Shu ltz's be lief that ·'the mental concept of the child is the controll ing factor of its creation. and the ori ginators of that concept merit fu ll credit as conceivers." 5/)
The lohmOI/ majority al so re lied on Professor Shultz's be li e f Ihat ""[w]ithin the context of artificia l reproductive tec hno logies ... intentions that are voluntarily chosen. delibe rate . express and bargained-for ollght presumptive ly to determine legal parellihood."~7 Litt le was said o n this particular po int. alt hough Hill"s artic le o ffered similar comments that furt her ex plain the rationale. Hi ll's thi nking is w0I1h repeating in full;
(Tlhe gestational host and genetic progeni tors sho uld be held to their orig inal promises not to seck any paremal ri ghts in the child .. the deontological strain hold~ that people generally shou ld be held to their promises simply beC[luse promise keepi ng is good in itself. The predicament of the intended p[lre nts is poignant precisely because the surrogate's promise is the very b[lsis for her involvemelll in the procreati ve relatjonshi p in the fi rst place. Absent a commitment o n her pan. the intended pllrents eould seek the assistllnce of another. BIll where the gest:uional host. or the genetic progenitor. .. h,IS g;lined access to the procreative re lationship initiated by another. she ~h o uld not be permitted the double injustice of f('n eging and . more imponanlly. retaining custody of the ch ild.
The conscquenlia list strai n of this argument emphasizes the re li:mce of the intended parents upon the promi se of other panics in the procreativc relationship. The intended parents rely. bUlh linanc ially and emoti onally. 10 their detri ment on the promi se of the biological progenitors and gestati onal host. They re ly finan cially by purl-hasing th(-material essentia ls of child-reari ng. including baby furnitu re. clothes. toys. and other accessories. They m:!yeven move or ex pand Iheir hOl11e to accommodate the new arr],,;)I . If the promi se of the other parti!.'s were not enforceable. the inlended parents l~o u ld not make these prepar:!tions without the po~s ibi lit y of losi ng their invcsullem.
More imponantly. the imendcd parents rel y emotion.llly on the prom ises of the others 10 refraiJl from claiming parenwl rights in the child. They rely by preparing themselves psychologically for parenthood and all that it entails. They also re ly cmotionally to the extenl that they have interacted with the surrogate and anticipated the binh of the ch i ld. j~
The two in terrehlled concerns essentially rcvolve around contractual relia nce: that the inte nded parents' cx pectalions mu st be met. and that the genetic or gestationa l contributors must be prevented from renegi ng. Another author complai ns that the genetic basis does not '"address the seri ous problem of prov iding an adequale remedy for abuses in the barga ining process betwee n part ies involved in assisted re productive <IITan gemems."!>' ) Add itionally_ the cOLIn al so re lied on Shult z'S notion that '"the interests of children ... arc unlike ly to rlln contrary to those of adult s who choose to bring the m into be ing.""/II' The inference is that the comracti ng parent s' desire to rai se a child is indicalive o f the ir responsibility and parenting abil ity.b' Th is rule supposedly would "promote cenaimy and stability for the c h i ld :'6~ 2. Flaws in the JolII/ so" O pinion Altho ugh the resuh of Johnson is in line wi th this no te's theories . the reasoning is ;everely nawed. as ex plained by di sse nting Justice Kennard. 1 )} Ke nnard first observed lhat "bu t-for" causatio n is prope rl y applied in tort law. but even the ll . California applied a "substantial factor" test in cau sati o n. He conceded that the inte nding mother was. of course. a "s ubstantial facto r" in the child 's creati on. but the theory was "misplaced" because. in reality. "[ b]o th the genetic and the gestalional mOl hers are ind ispensable to the birth of a ehild.f>. I ill ustrating that in the ART process. all parti es make appare ntl y equal contributio ns. Thi s is specificall y apparent whe re an intended parent screens the pote nt ial candidate for spec ific qualities (i .e .. the genes of a person with specific q ualiti es. such as appearance, tale nt. o r race).
In such cases. the ge neti c pare nts' contributio n is heightened because the contracting parent seeks a partic ular type of person, maki ng the gamete donor's contributio n even mo re '·substantia l."
Justice Kennard directly di scusses the pril1(;iples of child di gnity in hi s criti cism of the "ori ginato rs of concept"' rati o nale of the majority. He illustrates that the source of thi s reaso ni ng was from inte llectual prope rty law: the idea that ·· .. m idea be lo ngs to its creator because the idea is a manifestat io n of the creator's perso nality or se lf."M As Kennard correctly stated, the logical end of th is rationale is that the child mu st be conside red the property of the intending parent. Thi s treatment of children as prope rty is antithetica l to society's understanding uf childre n and famil y. There is a manifest inappropriate ness in applying th is rati onale in o rder to reach }ohll.wm 's result : it means that the child is a thing prope rly owed to one party o r another.
The sallle fault can be found with the ;'re li ance" rati onale ad vocated by Professors Shultz and Hill and the Johmon majority. It is ine1evant that the ART contract is voluntary, express, deliberate, and bargained for. If the contract were enforceabl e. the on ly real remedy is spec ific perfo mlance, the subj ect of which is the life of a child.&; Again. this theory is hig hl y inappropri ateY as it treats the child as a means of fulfi ll ing the ends soug ht by the pare nt s. Hill"s above passage is reveal ing : the concern is primaril y for the contracting parents' fina ncial and e mo tional investme nt, rather than the chi ld' s welt be ing. It is a gross violatio n of di gnity to Ireat the c hild as a placebo to ease the contracti ng pare nt s' loss. The child is no t a party to the contract, but instead the subject of it. Of course. the law rarely allows a no n-signatory to be bo und to a contract. and there is no reason to treat a child born of A RT any differently, While people no rmall y sho uld be held 10 the pro mises Ihey make . thi s in no way means that contract law is always controll in g. 68 It is axiommic thm the law can declare ce rtain contracts vo id for unconsc ionabi lit y. If contract ultimate ly con trols ART disputes. then what is the lim it to contract enforcement ? A purely contractual view o f fami ly law. regarding the fat e o f persons. rai ses questi ons about where it stops. It ri sks limiting the world to Justi ce Ho lmes' classic pos iti vist notion o f co ntract law thut "all contracts are forma l. land] that the making of a co nt ract depends no t on the ag reeme nt of two m ind s in one in tention. but 0 11 the agreement o f two sets of ex ternal signs."b9 If the pre~bil1h sale of a c hild can be enforced. whm prevents it aftl'r bi nh ? What prevents suits for spec ific pe rformance of aborli on o r prostituti on? In thi s regard. intent theory canno t reconcile itself. 11' the contracti ng parent's were proven the natural pare nts. then a kidnapping charge mi ght be fa r more effecti ve and appropriate than a property theory.
What thi s c ritici sm really ca ll s for is a claim for re liance damages. If the intending parents have ho nestly made large ex penditures in reliance on the deli very of a chi ld. the n re imbursemen t for that qualllifiabl e reliance mi g ht not be unju sl. lO The limit is fo r the courts to detennine. so long as it fall s sha ll o f spec ific performance in de livery of the child . Pro fessor Shultz ' s advocacy for comr:.tct e nfo rceability and Professor Hill's " prime mover" argument fai l to address chi ldren's rig hts and imcrests." much less the ir dignity.
The linal argument. that the intent to parent is indicative o f fitne ss.
also fa il s for two reasons : it is both inflexibl e and speculative. Justice
Kennard agreed w ith the majority that a rule seeking to protect the chil d's inte rests shou ld be paramount: hi s complaint. however. is that the rule makes an infl ex ibl e presumption for the contracti ng pare nts. n He fo resaw cases of substance abuse. instabil ity. economic change. and so all in the ho mes of the contracting parents. while the ho me of the parents denied c ustody wou ld be a reali sti call y better e nviron ment.
Hi s ana lysis illustrates another probl em of ART agreements: since they often amount to the equi vale nt of private adoptio ns. they occ ur o utside the watchfu l eye of state supervisio n. Thus. there may be no me,ms of knowing whether the indi vi duals to who m the child is being surrende red really are fit to parent. In adoptio ns. the state should be present throughout the process " to protect the integ rity of the adoption process by wh ich the child's right to suppon. management. and care may be re-establi shed in relation to an adopti ve pare m."1.\ In ART arrangements. the state has no presence unti l ~l problem arises. So. while ART allows parents to conveni ently override the red tape of the adoptio n process. 1~ those barriers do ex ist in order to pro tect the chi ld 's safety.
The related probl em is in declari ng in te nt as indicati ve o f fitne ss ; wilile perhaps intuitive . it is ult imately specul ative. How do we know that the intended parent s' intentions will not run contrary to the chi ld's best inleresls? One author points out that [he imen t [0 palent docs nOl guarantee the lIbiJity 10 parent. A woman is nOL miracli iously investcd with parcming skills just because. she wishes to parcnt. even when she has ex pended time and cffon to accomplish Iwr desires.
Commissioni ng \:ou plcs in assisted re product ion. and adoptive parents, who make extensive effon L O become parents. are hardly more righteous than the rest o f the population. 7 ' Additi on ally. at least one case of an ART-conceived child kill ed by his adopti ve parents 7 !> illu strales th at "intended" parent s are not in su.lnta neously fit parent s because o f tlleir intent.
The moral danger in ART cases show n by Johllson is that parenthood is "created" through contrac t. rather than as a social and legal relation. As one aluhor notes, a status-based theory of parentage implies obligarions on a Illorall eve l, or. failin g that. a legal require menllhat those ob ligations be fullill ed. 17 The source of obli gations in a purely contractual view o f pare ntage is more difficult to pinpoint. As a result , intent theorists should not be surpri sed that peop le like John Buzzanca 7S or homosex ual partners of genetic pare nts of ART children 7\1 wanl out of their parental obligations. pointing to their lack of biological connection as eliminating any obligation to the child. While a paternity suit in such cases might be enforceable, the fact that these suits and their defenses arise shoul d shock no one in a world where the view of fa mily is shifling from Status to contract.
III re Buzzum'u
The facts of Bllzzallca were di scussed in Part I, above . As stated, the California appeals court decl ared John and Luanne L o be the lawful parents of Jaycee, making John li abl e for child support. The result was reached by a clever judicial s l eight -of~hand , relyin g on Jollllso/l's determi nali on that Califo rnia 's paterni ty law "may" allow for paternity to be detemlined by several means. none of which explicitl y re lied upon genetics. It also relied upon statutes that allowed paternity to be establi shed by seve ral nongenetic means, such as marrying Ihe child 's mother before birth , consenting to being named as a father on a child 's birth ce rtificate, or consenting to the mt ifi cial insemination of one's wife. The court therefore analogized the Buzzancas' situation to that contemplated by the artifi cial insemination statute: " ... both contemplate the procreation of a child by the consent to a medical procedure of someone who intends to rai se the child but who otherwi se does not have any bi ological ti e:' 80 The cOLIn beli eved 292 Linacre Quarterl y , that the spirit of the law warranted the ex tension of paternity 10 Jo hn Buzzzanca as well: Ihe fact Ihat Luanne did nOI give b irth was irrelevant.
T he court observed that a simple estoppel theory wou ld have been sufficien t to e nsure Joh n 's patern ity; however, it took the theory a step funher so it could also declare Luanne to be the lawful mother. It likened Luanne to "a hu sband in un artificial insemination case whose conse nt triggers a medical procedure whic h results in a pregnancy and eventual binh o f a child."81 That is, just as a husband cou ld be declared a father by conse nting 10 inseminati on, so cou ld a mother because "there is .. .. no reason to di stinguish between hu sbands and wives. Both <Irc equa ll y siluated from the poi nt of view of consent ing to an act which brings a child into bcing."~~ That. combined wit h Luanne's inte nt to be Jaycee's mother, and the fac t that no other party attempted to claim custody, made her the " inte nded" mot her under lolll/.wl/. The coun be li eved that public poli cy encouraged thi s dcc ision: the establi shment ofpatern ilY wou ld prevent the tax:payers fro m payin g for the child' s care . Additi onally, Luanne's matem ity necess itated Ihal John be ass ig ncd paternit y: his " proc reat ive conduct." albeit anificia l. made him just as liable as an unintended fath er who engaged in casual sex . Controversiall y, the coun then declared that the Bu zzancas' names should appear on Jayceee's binh ce]1ificate.
4, Flaws in th e BII OZOZU"Cll Opinion
A lthough then: is 110 4uestion that the outCOllle o r BIIC.lIIU .. :lI was correct. the coun's method of reaching it s conclusion is even more confu sing than loIIllSOll'S. Whi le the dec isio n establi shed John and L uanne as Jaycee's parents, it fa ils to spec ify exactly what killd of parents they are beyond a vague " lawful" detemlination. Are they " natural " parent s? The fact that their names were ente red on the birth cenificate is strong evide nce that the coun intended thi s resu lt , yet it re mains a legal fic ti on that Luanne will someday have to ex plain to her "daug hter."
A likely explanat io n ro r the coun 's ruling was that the decision was outcorne·determinative; after all. the en ti re nature of the dispute was whether paternity obligations were e nforceable again st John, and the determining pare ntage was o nl y.] secondary issue. The coun's repeated concern-that if John we re correct. Jaycee would be an orphan and state ward-further suggests that the coun' s goal was finding any way to enforce John 's obl igation .
A repeated concem raised by intent theorists is that , in favoring bio logy over intenl, people like John Buzzanca wi ll have an escape to avoid paternal responsibilityY T he result , as the Buzzallca COUI1 feared, is that ART·children would become state wards and taxpayer burdens. The hean of the matter is that a child has bee n brought in to the world through techno logy and then abandoned by an indi vi dua l who unexpectedly wanted out of the contract. In terms of equhy, the dec ision makes sense: Jaycee herse lf (and Luanne on her behalf) had a strong reliance claim against John , That is, John 's so-called "procreative cond uct" creates reliance on Jaycee's part thm she would have a fath er fi gure to provide her with support. Th is is illustrated by John's signing of the contract two weeks afler implamati on: although John actuall y signed the con tract two weeks after implantation, the court correc tl y held the wrine n instrument mere ly ratified an oral agreement.
All BU::'::'lIllc a did was to advoc.ate th e already-ex isting "equitable parent" or "equitable adoption" doct rine. Because John assumed the soc ial role of a parent vis-a-vis Jaycee. he co u~d have been estopped from denying legal paterni ty.l!4 Thi s rule ex isted before int ent theory. so pragmatically, "inte nt" covers anything new. In fa ct. view ing the decision as one of equity exposes a major flaw of intent theory. As me nti oned above, some intent advocates bel ieve that th e rule guarantees stabi lity for the child. since the intent of parents is unlikely to nJn contrary to the child 's int e rests. 8~ Cases li ke BliU lIlI ClI show otherwise. Real isti cally, a child's interests include not just finan cial support from a parent, but also emori onal support and soc ial and moral gu ida nce. Intenltheory. despite its clai m, fa ils to prevent the problem of deadbe, at parents. At best. thi s theory only imposes a financia l obli gation to the c hild via the equ itable parent. Hence, John Buzzanca is nO! socially a father to Jaycee. but onl y a tinancial supplier, and has sworn never to be a father in any practi cal sense,86 While one author complains that these children "arc then left in limbo as to their parentage us well as their finan cia l support."K7 intent theory ensures on ly the latter. leaving the former still in question.
So why did the Buzzal/c(/ court go beyond a mere theory of equity? Likel y, it did so becau se it was the only way the court could declare Luanne's maternity. The courts had already dug a prove rbial hole by allowi ng the case to proceed fo r three years, during which Luanne and Jaycee undoubtedly bonded as a family. ss It would be a strange dec ision if involul/tary paternit y could be declared against John. but volll/Ifary paternity could not be granted to Luanne (Such a result might al so mean thai John. as a lawful parent. could remove Jaycee from Luanne, the unlawful parent. at his di scretion. ). It is possib le that the circumstances and elongated litigation left the court no pract ical c hoice by whic h to guarantee Luanne's muternity.
The problem is that the declaration was a complete legal fi ction. How thi s theory will play out in future I:iligation (for example. if lIlI potential donors silllultaneously sued for custody) mi ght reveal problematic result s. In the sh0l1tenn , BU::'::'lIJlCCl may have safeguarded the soc ial fun ction of the family. as one author suggests. IN But the coun 's theory also undenn ines the traditional famil y in three respects. According to Professor Radhika Rao. " the ideology of fami ly law is premised upon the ethos of a hrui s m:"~l that is. that the fa mily is supposed to be fou nded on love and affection. in polar opposit ion to market forces . whi ch are based on au tonomy a nd arms-length transactions."l Raa admits that this is a fal se dic hotomy: the fam il y and market have always shared functions. and ART exposes thi s facl.'!1 Regardless of whet her the fam ily docs have a commerc ial basis. the perspective has frightening implicati ons. By view ing famil y as a contract, rathe r than a statu s. il again undermines the sense of obligatiun tied to fami ly. She nOles that eliminat ing biology brings the famil y closer 10 a world of pure private ordering: 11 The potential resu lt is that fam ili al commitments " become both contingent and revocable . . . IP]arenthood by consent may encourage the attitude that fami ly relati onships can be freely e ntered and exited. accepted or rejec t ed : .q~ Thi rd. Rao notes that by making biology irrelevant to ART pare nts. il makes biology irrelevant to everyone: biology is no longer suffi cient or necessary even for tradiliollal biological parents." 3 Rao's reason ing suggests that paren ts of sexuall y conce ived childre n now have further incentive to j ustify a lack of obli gation to their childre n. If nongeneti c ART pare nt s such as John Buzzanca can free ly abandon paternity and be li able on ly fo r finance s., what stops traditional biologica l parents from doing the same'!)() A grow ing argument is thaI. under Roe 1'. ~*u'e. a putati ve father is allowed to escape responsib ilit ies for i.I chil d j ust as a mother can th rough abonion.<l1 The contractual view of fam ily inevitably creates such deri vative result s, If "intent" detemlines parentage in ART cases. what prevents intent from being the paradi gm of parenthood in every case? This view mi ght have li tt le impact on most families. since most "i ntended" parents are also the biological parents of their children.
However. de/illquelll or ;I/ad\'erlell/ fathers theoretically could cl aim a lack of in ten t. The theory otherwi se cremes an odd inconsistency: why impose liabi lity on a natural father who den ies responsi bil ity. yet deny paternity to an indi vidual who seeks to e mbrace it ? (Thi s cou ld also impact a natural mother's abi lity to revoke her consent to he r child' s adoption: the law could extend "intem"" even furt her to declare that a coupl e who intends to adopt a child shouldn' t be deni ed specific performance.) Bu:.zallC{/ likened itse lf to Slt'pliell K. 1', Roni L._<l~ in which a man who reli ed upon a fa lse statement that hi s sex ual partner was using bi l1h control pi Us could not bri ng a clai m o f fra ud against Ano ther ratio na le for intent theory is that it creates certainty in the dete nnin ation of a c hild 's parents. so her identity is no t in " Iimbo" during litigation : J9 The rati o nale exists for two reasons: first. it discourages biological parents fro m suing: second . it supposedl y protects the child 's identity. I!)) Thi s concept, while appealing . is still unpersuasive: legal effi c ie ncy is no rea~on to prevent a suit. particularl y where one party mi ght justly be the pro per pare nt. On the first point, lawsuits may streamline the legal process. but it fa il s to preve nt all lawsuits. and igno res thm a bener theory of bio logica l pare ntage may yet ex ist. The argument again presupposes that intent theory is the correct paradi gm. and does not address the theory's me rit s. The arg ume nt also applies to allY mode l o f pare ntage : if the pr~s umpli on fa vored bi o log ical parent s. the "bright -line" certaint y o f a predictabl e result in liti gation will re ma in .
The second ratio nale-the protecti on of the child 's identity-mi ght be more merilOriolls, since protecting the child's sense of se lf is a poor outcome. However. the " protectio n" will probabl y o nl y amount to a delay ing tactic. since the child w ill inevitabl y di scover her ART ori g ins and stilt have her sense of self impacted. TIle "certainty" of paternity is al so the theory 's we akness-it speaks little of the child's best interests. WI It is therefore ho llow: inte nt onl y guarantees outcome . not well -being.
A confused and ultimate ly non -sequitur arg ume nt is that ART arrangements must be e nforced because to do otherw ise vio lates a woman's fundam e nt al ri ght to contract. According to one ad vocate. " [pJro hibiting women from freel y entering into c.ontracts. or any type of deal. de means th em." I11~ Obviously. women have thi s rig ht, and no ratio nal jurist can questio n that. The rationale's fl aw is its breadth: it ass umes that contract and free c ho ice supercede any other consideratio n. The author igno res that some contracts are unenforceable o n publi c po li cy grounds, such as illegality and unconscionability. If women reall y have an unlimited rig ht to contract. does thi s mean that a client for prostitution can demand specific performance? Can an abo rtio ni st do the same o nce a woman signs a consent fo rm ? If a woman freely contracts to sell a limb. and then reneges. should the law e nforce it?
Thi s argument takes a questio n of conscience and answers with equal protectio n, dodgin g the orig inal issue. It unfairl y delllalld.~ that women stand by a potentiall y uncon scio nable contrac t just to prove a po int about gender equality. Even if equal protection is a leg itimate concern , l1ana Hurw itz's response is belter. She notes that " [tJo exerci se a change of heart is both finan ciall y and e motionally cost ly fo r a surrogate ... [SJ urrogates w ho change thei r minds. desp ite the inordinate ri sks, demo nstrate the autonomy and fonitude of womcn. not their supposed frailti cs: ·]I).l Thi s "ri ght to contrac t" also fail s to answer the moral question of child se lling or comraclS invo lving c hildren. The argument di ctates that contract is always the morall y controll ing f;actor.' O-l but a pure contract theory ignores that the child's futu re is being predete rmined by linancial exchan ge. So while intent theory mi ght stre ngthen wome n' s fundame ntal rights. it severely impac ts those of the children involved.
A related argument is that indi vidual s e ntering ART contracts do so with fu ll realization of the consequences. such as medical ri sks and emotional costS. IO' s Th is theory point s to the fact that many genetic contributors already have c hildren of their own . and are therefore prepared for the ex perie nce of sWTe ndering a c hi ld. IOb The !law he re is that wh ile intent is a basic require ment of contract law. as the court complained in Belisro I' . Clark. intent can be hard to prove" 107 Furthermore. inte nt can dUll/Sf! as the genetic contribut or rea li zes the magnitude of the contract. One au thor argues: "lllntenti ons concernin g: parenthood before a c bild comes into being are not required to be stable or fix ed." ' OI! Thi s is apparent from women who change their minds about g iving up a child for adoption or having an aborti on.'0' 1 The facl is that "peopl e's in te nti ons are rarely unidimensional or everlasting, and it is rarely possible to ide ntify a pe rson 's one. tfue inte nt."I 'o Even a surrendering pare nt who has previously given birth may not realize the consequences of giving away a child in coniract. "Give n the c hanges in feeling that we know frequentl y occur. and that we generally want to occur, during pregnancy and at birth . the informed voluntariness of the choice to gi ve up the chUd is at its peak when made with fu ll awareness of the pain e ntailed-·after lhe child comes into being."'" Therefore. a lack of undue inOuenc(:. duress. or coercion in ART COnlracts is in' C levant , since some unconsc ionable contracts can be entered without those fac lOrs.
Furthe rmore, if the complaint is that some genetic contributors already have children is taken to mean "so why do they need more?," the n the statement is unfai r. The logical extens ion of the nllional e is that childre n arc utilitarian commoditi es. and that the bil1h of some chi ldren dec reases the need for more . The argument makes the genetic pare nt appear to have less necessity fo r that parti cular child. whil e the contracti ng pare nt has I//Or f! necessit y for the child. The inte nt argument c reates roundabout sympathy for the intended reci pie nts. Regard less. sympathy for the unfortunate infel1ility of those persons does not e ntit le them to a child as a social remedy. This argume nt recalls the importance of continual fe-e mphas is of the child 's ind ividual dignity. Even one intent theorist adm its that "[e]motions concerning parenthood are sufficientl y predi ctable and of such a transforming nature lhal any atte mpt to reduce them to the fo ur comers of a comract seriously unde rmines the profound experience of c reati ng life:'!!! The central basis for the contract model may be. as one author claims, an underlying assumption that the human body is one's property and therefore a freely transferable good,I 13 According to Kennit Roosevelt. since many courts now recog ni ze property rights in gametes, parental rights should be detennined by who has property rights in the reproductive malerhli when gestat io n begin s.IIJ In other words. parental rights are derived from propel1y rights.
Roosevelt 's argument admittedly has more merit. since he creatively relocates where parental rights vest. Effectively. he concedes the power of biology. but does so by Slating that gametes are as tran sferable as blood. skin . and organs. If an egg is transferred from one woman to another. il becomes the second woman's egg. The problem is that Rooseve lt never exactly states from where he makes the detennination that the body is transferable to begin outside of a vague belief that 'lwlithout any property rights in the body, we would have the odd result that othe rs have as much claim to our bodies as we do:"'! He may have mere ly assumed the assessment for the sake of hi s arg ument. But even assuming that the body is property, Rooseveh's argument is that paternity is free ly tran sfe rable . Things are certainly marketable. but neither a child nor a status can be treated the same way. The President of the Un ited States cannot sell hi s job title. A parent cannot sell the fac t that he is genetically related to someone.
There is something disturbing about the body bei ng a property interest. as Roosevelt himse lf admits!"' > The language is inappropriate. as it suggests that the human body is somehow separate from the human person. The source of these propelly rights is not explai ned. unless it is just some strange incidence of birth that one is born with the body thal o ne owns. The resulting questio n is whether one could theoreti cally sell hi s entire body. and if so. whether the law must e nforce that contract. Roosevelt notes that the 13t h Amendment 's prohibitio n of slavery renders o ne's righ ts in the body inalienable. 1I7 So even if property ownership detennincs the relationship of the body to the perso n, o ur bener sense suggests that there must be logical a nd Illorallimits to the ability to transfer one 's body. Hence. a contract fo r prostitut ion or abort ion must be unconditionally voi dable by the person with the so-called property interest in the body.
This must also be true with ART. Sil1(:e the transfer of both paternity and a child is involved, this would a lso be a case where the contract must be voidable. Even Roosevelt admits that the transfer of paternity and chi ldren are ill egal and void: hi s solution "cheats" the illegality by moving the line of where pmemity vests. Others frankly adm it that the notion of " famil y" must be expanded in order to make the intent argument e ffec ti ve. !l~ Again. the problem is that lin gui stic manipulati o n cannot overcome fa ctual and bio logical reality. PUlling the Buzzancas' names on Jaycee's binh cenificate does not make them her natural pare nts. 1I 9 The e ff0i1 is di sturbingly similar to the belie f of Wi nston, the protagoni st of Orwe ll 's 1984 . that reality ex ists entirely within rile mind. as determ ined by tbe stute. IZO These theories do the same th ing: they alter the rea lity of patern ity in o rder to escape the moral and legal proh ibition of child sell ing by arguing thai no sale ever happened.
Even if intenllheon sts be lieve thiU intent is a mere termino logy used in parentage determinatio ns, and no t a contract, the problem is that contract law must inev itably be applied in these disputes. T hat applicatio n, of course, violates a chi ld's dignity by it s vCI)' nature. One author's criticism is very reveal ing:
In the end. the notion of intent cannot renect and preserve autonomo us indiv iduality lmd, at the sallle time. provide proof (as a substitute for biological "facts"' such as blood and genes) of the enduring essence of fam i1i:11 love and loya lty, ludicial reliance on intent in ca:<;es such as } vhnwlII will prove impractical or wi ll be e . .. prcssly transformed illlo a more straighlforward reliance on ordinary ('ontTact principles. II I Fw1her11lore, as ex plained above , intent fa ils to entertain seriously the i n teres t s.!2~ muc h less the di gnity. of the child . Marsha Garri so n very succinctl y desc ribes the proble m:
Gi ven Ihal our legal lradition precludes per se enforcement of all cormacls concerning children. a proposal to gmnt per se enforcement co a single cont ract subse t should be supported by a detennination that this group is sufticiem ly different fro m the rel1l:ti ndc r to justi fy incons iste nt treat ment, or in the e\'elll th:u the governing advocate is will ing 10 ex tend per se en forccmenl to all COlliracts govcrning ch ildren's cnre and status,;\ ~h ow in g that thi s approach is preferrablc to the tradi tional one. !:) Unt il in tent theori sts can make such a showing, intent theory wi ll inevili:lbly collapse upon its own shaky fo undatio n.
VI. Conclusion
Th is al1icle began by reaffi rming thaI. when a c hild has been created through ass isted reproductive tec hnologies, the primary and continual consideration of the law sho uld be maintaining the chi ld 's inaJie nnble dignity. Whi le the vel)' use of ART consti tutes a signifi cant violation of the Nove mber. 2004 (.~hild' s dignit y, the violation need not continue. The law c anno t undo what has happe ned_ but can ensure that the child 's future is resto red to its proper path.
Thi s articl e has also illustrated why " intent theory," the increasingly popular paradigm of pare ntage. is incorrecl. Intent theory ultimately acts as a contractual model of parenthood that half-heartedl y attempts to protect traditional notio ns of children. parents. and the famil y. The theory treats children as fungible propert y and the famil y as a contractual relationship that can be freely exited. In the lo ng term. thi s theory will do more hann than good to the social function of the famil y. It improperl y changes the family from a status to a contract , thereby eliminating much of the mo ral value of the relatio nship. Th is article has de monstrated that even the most meritorious rationales for intent theory ultimately fail to create a proper model of the famil y or to protect human di gnity. Whil e another theory fa voring " inte nded" parenls mig ht be morc acceptable. intent theory in its current form is unable to do so.
Lawyers_ coW1S, legis lato rs. and most importantly, parents, should be wary of these considerations in the future. As Buw mca indicated. " ftlhese cases will not go away." The law must prepare to reaffinn that which made the famil y sllch a lasting institution.
The alit/un' wishes to thal/k hi.\· parents, c/assllllltes. with particlilar thal1ks to Jolm Mall os, Jason Neg ri, Joshua Skillllel; Robert Klllcik, MOllica L. Secord. alld Ave Maria Profe!iSOrS Richard Myers alld Jalle Adolphe.
